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Financial advisors have long been considered a part of the financial market through the 
advice that they offer investors.  Behavioural finance has demonstrated that individual 
investors do not always behave in a rational manner, unlike financial advisors who seem not 
be prone to the behavioural biases that individuals experience when investment decisions 
are made. Furthermore, financial advisors have greater access to information, financial 
analytical tools, as well as better education in financial markets compared to the average 
individual. Financial advisors are thus better equipped to assist individual investors and 
provide them with improved investment results. 
This study investigated the value added by financial advisors in the investment performance 
of advised individual investors as opposed to non-advised individuals. The study wanted to 
establish whether financially advised individuals showed greater return on investments than 
non-advised individuals.  A sample of individual investors from a large South African 
investment house were analysed across the investment categories of an advised investor 
and a non-advised investor for a period of 10 years from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 
2014. The data was analysed to draw conclusions on returns, trading behaviour, the risk 
profile of investors and the reasons for differences identified. 
The results indicated that there is no statistical difference between the returns generated 
between advised investors, non-advised investors and the fund invested over the period. 
There was a statistical difference between the number of trades entered into by advised 
and non-advised investors, with advised investors making statistically more trades than non-
advised investors. There was no significant difference between the risk profiles of the 
investors based on qualitative data. The results indicate that there is no significant 
additional benefit of utilising a financial advisor, after the initial decision of which fund to 
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The development of the financial world has brought forth an array of complex financial 
instruments, vast volumes of investment data and advanced data analytic tools. The role of 
financial advisors within the investment community has therefore become more important 
over the past few years. They play a crucial role in managing the risk of the investor and 
identifying appropriate investment solutions specific to the individual. Financial advisors 
provide guidance to individual investors on the appropriate investment decision to be 
made.  
This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the role that financial advisors play. Through 
an evaluation of the investment return data for advised and non-advised investors, the 
study will quantify the value created by financial advisors and analyse the trading behaviour 
of investors. This will determine the influence financial advisors have on value creation for 
the individual. 
This study will analyse data over a 10 year period for advised and non-advised investors 
invested in a fund of a large South African investment house. The data evaluated has two 
key focuses; firstly an analysis of the return data generated for advised and non-advised 
investors, and secondly an analysis of the trading behaviour of advised and non-advised 
investors and whether the trading behaviour created the differences in return. Another 
focus of the study is to evaluate the risk profiles of the advised and non-advised investors. 
An analysis of the relevant literature in Section 4 will be detailed to provide the context of 
the study. The literature review will explore the concepts of the individual investor and 
financial advice. The individual investor analysis is focussed on behavioural biases that the 
investor is subject to, specifically relating to overconfidence; self-attribution bias; 
overtrading; and the disposition effect. The literature will evaluate the causes and 
implications of these biases for the individual investor. The analysis also explores the 
advantages of financial advice, the different types of value created by financial advisors and 
provides a contrary view to the advantages of financial advice. There are other influences on 
the study such as the cost of financial information and financial literacy levels which will be 
detailed as well.  
The research questions evaluated are in line with the focus of the study being return and 
trading behaviour analysis between advised and non-advised investors. The primary focus is 
to evaluate whether there are differences in the returns generated by advised and non-
advised investors over the period. The differences in the returns are thereafter evaluated in 
terms of the trading behaviour, to determine whether there is a difference in the trading 
behaviour and also whether the difference in trading behaviour may have had an effect on 
the returns of the investors. The final question evaluated is the risk profiles of the advised 
and non-advised investors and whether there are any differences in the two risk profiles. 
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The results of the research questions are analysed in line with the expectations generated in 
the literature review. Inferences are made between the outcomes of the return data, 
trading behaviour and risk profiles of the investors to determine whether any significant 
factors contribute to the success of the financial advisor. Particular findings that warrant 
specific investigation are further evaluated, and appropriate conclusions derived. 
Any shortcomings of this study are noted and recommendations for further studies are 
provided based on anomalies identified. 
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4. Literature review 
 
The literature review will explore the role and impact financial advisors have on investment 
returns. The focal question of this study is whether financial advisors create additional 
investment return for advised investors compared to non-advised investors, which has 
guided the scope of the literature review. 
This question has shaped the literature review broadly into three categories, namely: 
behavioural biases, the advantages of financial advice, and exploration of the idea of an 
opposing view. There are other factors; such as the cost of information to enter the 
investment market and risk profiles of whom utilises financial advisors, mentioned in the 
review as well which lend itself to the scope of the research of the topic.  
These topics were researched to explore the effects of financial advice on returns as well as 
the possible pitfalls that individuals not utilising financial advice may be subjected to. 
 
4.1 Behavioural biases of individual investors 
 
In the 1960s, the efficient market hypothesis, that has been considered the cornerstone of 
modern financial theory, was developed by renowned economist Eugene Fama. This 
concept proclaims that financial markets reflect all relevant information at any given point 
in time. It assumes that whenever new information surfaces, individual expectations will be 
updated accordingly and, as a result, so too will the market. The hypothesis therefore 
expects that individuals will act and make decisions in a way that will allow them to 
maximise their expected utility (Fama & French, 1992). 
However, studies in behavioural finance have shown that individuals tend to deviate from 
this hypothesis as they do not always act and invest rationally, and therefore do not always 
maximise their utility (Willows, 2012). These deviations occur as a result of certain errors in 
the way that individuals think, in comparison to the rational investor. Willows and West 
(2012) illustrated that these errors include poor self-control, placing too much weight on 
recent experiences, strong preferences for instant gratification, acting on rules of thumb 
and preferences. Such errors and differences in thought process in relation to the rational 
investor are known as behavioural or cognitive biases. These biases offer some insight into 
the investment decision-making process of individuals, and possible reasons for the pitfalls 
of certain investment decisions.  
Behavioural bias research evaluated biases that were considered to be prevalent to 
individuals’ investment strategies, and those that might display themselves in the returns 
and trading patterns of non-advised investors. Advised investors are not expected be prone 
to behavioural biases as the rational third party advice of the financial advisor is expected to 
overcome these behavioural pitfalls. 
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These behaviour biases include overconfidence, self-attribution, overtrading and the 
disposition effect. 
 
4.1.1 Overconfidence and self-attribution bias 
 
In one of the founding studies in behavioural finance, De Bondt and Thaler (1995) found 
that the fundamental error in judgement of individuals is as a result of overconfidence. 
Overconfidence can be defined as the tendency of individuals to overestimate their own 
information, knowledge and skills, and therefore overestimate their chances of success 
(Cheng, 2007). 
This bias was proven in a study by Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977), in which 
participants were asked a number of general knowledge questions and were thereafter 
asked to indicate their degree of certainty in the accuracy of their answers. The results 
reflected that the participants were consistently overconfident in their responses, so much 
so that they were even willing to stake money on its accuracy. These results were 
reconfirmed years later by Barber and Odean (2000) among investors in a discount 
brokerage house which came to the same conclusions. 
Various studies across decades have found that this bias is more prevalent in men than 
women (Estes & Hosseini, 1988; Powell & Ansic, 1997). Male overconfidence is considered 
to be an evolutionary trait due to their past positions as hunters and providers, and 
therefore risk takers, all which required confidence (Subrahmanyam, 2007). However, even 
in more modern times, men are still found to be significantly more confident than women 
across high and low knowledge groups (Gysler, Kruse & Schubert, 2002). This has been 
reconfirmed in a recent study by Willows (2012).  
By overestimating the precision of their information, overconfident investors believe in an 
investment more than they should and, hence, expect gains from trading (Barber & Odean, 
2001). According to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2006), “[w]hen one’s private valuation of a 
stock differs from that of the market, the overconfident investor places more validity on his 
private valuation and less on the market’s valuation.” Thus, in their study using a 
comprehensive dataset from Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju found that it is overconfident 
investors who were most prone to sensation-seeking and therefore traded more frequently. 
This frequent trading exposes investors to higher levels of risk, increased transaction costs 
and consequently lower total returns (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger & Rui, 2007).  
Moreover, literature on empirical psychology reports that individuals update their 
confidence in their own ability in a biased manner when observing the outcomes of their 
actions (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998). For example, individuals attribute 
events that confirm the validity of their actions to high ability, and events that disconfirm 
their action to external noise or sabotage (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998). This 
pattern of behaviour is referred to as self-attribution bias. According to Hirschleifer and Ying 
Luo (2001), self-attribution bias is a learning process. Investors do not initially know their 
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ability. Instead they learn through experience. “Traders who successfully forecast next 
period dividends improperly update their beliefs; they overweight the possibility that their 





When overconfident investors believe in a security more than they should, they 
subsequently trade more than what is expected of a rational investor (Odean, 1998). The 
hypothesis that overconfidence leads to high trading volume was tested by Statman, 
Thorley and Vorkink (2006) using U.S. market level data. They found that trading activity 
increased after bull markets; and that trading volume is positively related to high past 
returns. These findings confirmed those of Kim and Nofsinger (2003) who tested a similar 
hypothesis using Japanese market level data and found higher monthly turnover in 
securities held by individuals during the bull market. 
Odean (1999) reported that the worst financial performers are the ones that trade the most. 
The return-reducing effect of overtrading due to overconfidence was illustrated in a study 
by Barber and Odean (2000) in which the accounts of a sample of households at a large U.S. 
discount brokerage house were investigated from 1991 to 1996. It was found that investors 
who traded actively earned an annual return of 11.4% which was well below the market 
return of 17.9% at the time. The study therefore concluded that investors pay a penalty 
when trading actively. This result was re-confirmed by Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2007) 
who computed an annual performance penalty of 3.8% for Taiwanese individual investors 
due to their aggressive trading.  
Barber and Odean (2000) previous studies indicated that overconfident investors’ trade 
more frequently than they should, and that men were found to be more overconfident than 
women. This led them to perform a subsequent study with a particular focus to establish 
whether men traded more than women. Their results indicated that men traded 45% more 
than women, and that the additional trading reduced male returns by 2.65% compared to a 
reduction of 1.72% in female returns (Barber & Odean, 2001). 
A more recent study of individuals from a South African investment house was carried out 
by Willows (2012). The study evaluated the trading behaviour, returns and variances in 
returns earned by men and women. The results were consistent with that of Barber and 
Odean (2001) which demonstrated that a statistically significant negative correlation exists 




4.1.3 The disposition effect 
 
The disposition effect is the phenomenon in which investors sell winning investments too 
early and losing investments too late (Odean, 1998). Chen et al (2007) claim that “[p]eople 
avoid actions that create regret and seek actions that cause pride”. Therefore, selling a stock 
that has increased in value, also referred to as a winner, is a form of validation to an 
investor for the good decision made in purchasing the stock in the first place. Similarly, to 
sell a stock that has decreased in value, in other words, a loser, would indicate that the 
original decision to purchase was poor and therefore causes regret (Chen et al, 2007). 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) also found that investors tend not to sell losers as they are 
afraid that the stock may recover, thereby causing further regret. Further findings from 
behavioural economics suggest that investors are prone to a biased perception of 
preferences i.e. an individual’s judgements are influenced by their actual feelings towards a 
specific situation (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002). Fischer and Gerhardt (2007) 
explain that the bias towards certain feelings may overlay logical assessments and therefore 
cause incorrect evaluations of investment horizons.  This may result in incorrect investment 
decisions being made. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) implied that the disposition effect is an extension of Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. The prospect theory dictates that in times of 
uncertainty, investors are risk averse in the area of gains and risk seeking in the area of 
losses. Another element of the disposition effect is the concept of mental accounting, which 
explains an investors’ tendency to segregate different gambles faced into separate mental 
accounts. The investor therefore tends to keep track of gains and losses of individual stocks 
rather than on a portfolio level (Shefrin & Statman, 1985; Thaler, 1980). The disposition 
effect is therefore a combination of principles of the prospect theory and mental 
accounting, to predict that investors are more willing to sell winners than losers in their 
portfolios (Chen et al, 2007). 
In investigating the disposition effect, Odean (1998) analysed the trading activity of 10,000 
households with accounts at a large discount brokerage firm over a period of six years. He 
found that that investors in his sample who sold shares were more inclined to sell shares 
that has increased in value rather than ones that had fallen in value. Shapira and Venezia 
(2001) examined brokerage accounts in Israel to determine whether the disposition effect 
held for both individual investors and professionals. They found that, on average, individuals 
held on to poorly performing stocks eight days longer than professional institutional 
investors. Concluding that the disposition effect exists for both individual investors and 




4.2 Financial literacy and investment decisions 
 
When making investment decisions, individuals face complexities in deciding how to 
allocate their endowed financial assets as they need to consider their investment horizons, 
human capital, taxation and risk preferences (Fischer & Gerhardt, 2007). Barber and Odean 
(2008) conveyed that choosing where to invest represents a huge problem to the individual 
as there are thousands of possibilities and it is near impossible for most individuals to 
evaluate the merits of every available option. The level of financial literacy – the ability to 
understand the role of money and how to invest/manage it - plays a key role in an 
individual’s ability to make successful investment decisions. Financial advisors can fill this 
gap in knowledge to assist in making optimal investment decisions. 
A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010 
reviewed financial literacy in 13 countries including the USA, the UK, European countries, 
Australia and Japan. The OECD is an international economic organisation of 34 countries 
created to stimulate economic progress and world trade. The study concluded that financial 
literacy levels in those countries were very low for most respondents. The study evaluated 
the level of financial literacy through responses of the individuals to financial risk questions 
and the steps taken by the individual to educate themselves on financial matters. The study 
indicated that the individuals were too afraid to invest in products they could not 
understand, due to the limit financial literacy levels. As a result financial advisors played a 
crucial role in the investment decision for these individuals, as 55% of the individuals utilised 
a financial advisor as the primary source of information in making an investment decision 
(Atkinson & Messy, 2012). 
A later study was commissioned by the Financial Services Board (FSB) in 2011 where the 
OECD survey was extended to acquire insight into the level of financial literacy in South 
Africa. The FSB is the South African government’s financial regulatory agency responsible for 
the non-banking financial services industry in South Africa. A representative sample of 2,972 
randomly selected South Africans participated in the survey, all of whom were 16 years of 
age or older and living in households, hostels and other structures. The study was organised 
into four core domains, namely financial control; financial planning; choosing appropriate 
financial products; and knowledge and understanding (FSB, 2012). 
Analysis of each of these domains showed that the overall financial literacy levels of the 
participants were low, and also identified certain trends across sub-groups such as gender, 
age, race, place of residence, and education levels. The analysis showed that literacy levels 
were significantly lower for: women relative to men; younger relative to older respondents; 
Black Africans relative to all other population groups; low living standard relative to 
medium/high living standard; rural and informal areas relative to urban formal areas; and 
low level of education relative to higher levels of education. The study further indicated that 
financial literacy level scores increased as the level of education increased. This differential 




4.3 The cost of information when investing 
 
Another important consideration for individuals when investing is the costs involved in 
participating in the investment market. According to Fischer and Gerhardt (2007), these 
costs include time efforts for acquiring knowledge and gathering information, and fixed 
entry costs to obtain a securities account. Furthermore there are also psychological effects 
such as stress or fear relating to losing money (Fischer & Gerhardt, 2007). Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2003) explains that “first-time buyers likely incur an initial cost representing the 
time/money spent understanding basic investment principles as well as acquiring enough 
information about risks and returns to determine the household's optimal mix between 
stocks and riskless assets. Add to that the cost of time spent setting up accounts. 
Subsequently, a per-period stock-market participation cost may be incurred. This cost would 
include the value of time spent throughout the year determining if trading is optimal.” Even 
though the internet provides individuals with easy access to vast amounts of information, 
Kramer (2009) reports that, it is unlikely that the average individual can digest, analyse and 
interpret everything appropriately.  
Bakos (1997) researched two types of participation costs, namely cost of obtaining price 
information and cost of obtaining information about product characteristics. The model that 
he developed explained that if all product offerings available were plotted along a circle, 
before buyers decide to purchase a product, they are required to pay search costs in order 
to find its location. “The distance between the buyer’s ideal product and the location of the 
actual product imposes a ‘fit’ cost on the buyer, which represents the loss of utility from 
purchasing a less than ideal product.” Even though the existence of electronic market places 
lessens this cost (Bakos, 1997), the costliness of information leads to sub-optimal decisions 
by individuals because the individual lacks better information (Bluethgen, Gintschel, 
Hackethal, & Muller, 2008). Similarly, Merton (1987) also related the lack of information to 
the incompleteness of individual portfolios, substantiating the fact that individuals only 
purchase stocks that they know about. This behaviour was confirmed by Barber and Odean 
(2008) who argued that investors solve their search problem by considering only those 
stocks that have caught their attention recently. The Barber and Odean (2008) study 
concluded that individuals do display attention-driven buying behaviour in terms of 
knowledge of the stocks and the recentness of the information. 
Financial awareness therefore plays a key role in the level of participation in the market. 
Guiso and Japelli (2005) found that higher financial awareness and higher social interaction 
may lead to lower participation costs as well as higher levels of investment market 
participation. However, as stated in 4.2, financial literacy levels (hence financial awareness) 
differ across demographics such as gender, income and education levels. Guiso and Japelli 
(2005) argue that there is a strong correlation between awareness, and demographic 
variables like education, wealth and income, which increases the probability of purchasing 
stocks. Investors will only benefit from market participation if the expected excess return 
exceeds the costs incurred. Due to participation costs involved, it is therefore considered 
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unreasonable for individuals with low wealth to invest. This argument was quantitatively 
illustrated by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) as well as Haliassos (2006). 
The research thus shows that there are numerous costs associated with participation in the 
financial market for an individual. The use of financial advisors eliminates certain of these 
costs of information; such as the cost to research the investment options as the financial 
advisor will provide this service to the investor and present the available investment 
options. It is for this service that financial advisors are remunerated, as well as for providing 
meaningful financial data and guidance to the investor to make an informed investment 
decision. 
 
4.4 Advantages of financial advice for investors 
 
As the financial environment grows in complexity, so too does the knowledge gap between 
individual consumers and the financial issues that affect them. Financial advisors therefore 
play a critical role in bridging this gap. Financial advice can be defined as the provision of 
information and recommendations with regards to an individual’s investment and asset 
management needs (Dutkiewicz, Levin & Dukhi, 2007). According to Fischer and Gerhardt 
(2007) financial advisors possess a set of advantages that enable them to create value for 
their customers. These advantages include a solid financial education and an information 
lead over individuals as a result of their extensive interaction in financial markets. Financial 
advisors also have access to required resources, such as information systems, for collecting 
and analysing of data. Furthermore, together with their investment training and skills, leave 
individual investors at a disadvantage (Barber, Lee, Liu & Odean, 2007). These advantages 
which financial advisors possess over individual investors, together with the various 
cognitive biases suffered by individual investors, could lead to large economic losses for 
individuals (Barber, Lee, Liu & Odean, 2007).  
Bluethgen, Gintschel, Hackethal and Muller (2008) suggest that the three primary 
motivations for obtaining financial advice are; the cost of obtaining sufficient and 
appropriate investment information is large, to prevent individuals whom suffer from 
cognitive biases and errors from making incorrect investment decisions, and to improve 
portfolio diversity. The results of the study supported the theory that it is more costly, in 
monetary terms, to utilise a financial advisor than to transact as an individual due to the 
additional advisory fees for the advice obtained from the financial advisor, and that advised 
portfolios are more diverse than non-advised portfolios which are too concentrated in a 
limited number of stocks. Bluethgen et al’s (2008) analysis also confirmed that “older, 





4.4.1 Different types of value created for investors 
 
In their paper examining the value of financial advice, Dutkiewicz, Levin and Dukhi (2007) 
considered various measures of value. The two key measures that were discussed and 
evaluated were real and perceived value. Real value is defined as the financial impact on an 
individual in real monetary terms, either immediately or at some point in the future. More 
simply put, real value is the increase or decrease in an individual’s wealth as a result of the 
decision taken due to the given advice. Perceived value takes into account real value as well 
as qualitative aspects such as an individual’s perceptions, behaviours and nature of 
accumulated funds. To demonstrate perceived value, the following example is used – “in a 
stokvel
1
 with 12 people each paying in R100 per month for 12 months, each person will 
receive R1,200 after 12 months to buy some significant item”. The perceived value in this 
example is therefore the value obtained by the individual who otherwise would not have 
saved.  
Through the process of providing financial advice there are various potential psychological 
benefits that are also provided to an individual. This includes a development of trust 
between the advisor and individual, or simply the peace of mind created for the individual 
as a result of someone knowledgeable having looked at their financial affairs. Just like 
visiting a doctor for an annual check-up and discovering that nothing is wrong, value is 
derived through the peace of mind created for the individual (Dutkiewicz, Levin & Dukhi, 
2007).  
Fischer and Gerhardt (2007) also considered the relevance of time savings as a result of 
individuals not having to search for investment opportunities themselves and improved 
financial knowledge from continuous advice received. It is important to consider that 
situations can also occur where perceived value is positive even though real value is 
negative. From an advisor’s perspective, it is therefore important to assist individuals who 
are in this situation, where real value is negative, and ensure that the right decisions are 
made so that both perceived and real value are positive (Dutkiewicz, Levin & Dukhi, 2007). 
 
4.4.2 Financial advice and investment decisions 
 
In their evaluation of the mistakes made by individual investors, Fischer and Gerhardt (2007) 
developed a framework to provide a structure for the further investigation of individual’s 
investment decisions. This investigation of investment decisions was completed by using the 
framework as a generic investment process for individuals. This framework distinguished six 
principal phases in the investment decision making process, namely:  
                                                      
1
 A stokvel is a savings or investment society to which members regularly contribute an agreed amount and 
from which they receive a lump sum payment. 
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1) Assess personal balance sheet – assessment of an investor’s current financial and life 
cycle situation which includes net assets and liabilities as well as future cash flows.  
2) Assess risk aversion and investment horizon – a more subjective assessment of an 
investor’s willingness to bear risk, investment goals and time horizons. 
3) Determine optimal allocation to asset classes – allocation to certain asset classes such as 
bonds, equity, property, etc. given an investor’s situation, preferences and goals. Also 
known as strategic asset allocation. 
4) Select securities – specific security selection within the asset classes. Also known as 
tactical asset allocation. 
5) Perform transaction – implementation of the investment strategy through placing of 
orders to buy or sell securities. 
6) Monitor wealth – monitoring of portfolio composition and performance in line with 
investment goals and risk preferences, and making adjustments where necessary. 
Within each of the above phases, existing research and financial theories/principles were 
compared to empirical evidence of the actual behaviour of individual investors. The results 
indicated that the actual behaviour exhibited by individuals showed significant deviations 
from normative financial theories due to various behavioural biases such as overconfidence, 
risk aversion, mental accounting and inertia. The costs of these deviations were then 
quantified and showed that considerable welfare losses were suffered by the individuals. 
Financial advice was subsequently brought into the various stages of the framework as a 
mitigating factor for the deviations displayed and its potential value added for the individual 
was illustrated. There were however certain assumptions which were made in this regard, 
namely that advisors aim to protect their clients from investment mistakes thereby ignoring 
potential principal-agent problems; and that advisors are not affected by behavioural 
anomalies to the same extent as individuals.  
Empirical research suggests that individuals are unique in terms of their life cycle needs, 
financial situation, risk tolerance and investment goals (IFIC Report, 2010). Fischer and 
Gerhardt (2007) found that “the phases of the investment process that need to be focused 
on and the potential added value of financial advice differs between investors”. Thus it was 
deduced that “a major challenge for financial advice is to identify the potential investment 
mistakes of investors and improve their investment decisions up to the level of normative 
recommendations from financial literature” (Fischer & Gerhardt, 2007). As a result it can be 
hypothesised that the more individuals deviate from financial theories, the more potential 
there is for financial advice to improve their investments.  
Financial advisors provide a wide range of services to assist these needs, and bridge the gap 
of individual decisions made compared to financial theories and principles. Ideally, advisors 
would work together with individuals who, based on personal data, objectives and relevant 
constraints, would help them choose the right asset mix to maximise their utility (Bluethgen, 
Gintschel, Hackethal & Muller, 2008). The value for individuals is that with advice their 
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portfolios could be weighted according to their specific needs and time horizons. Advisors 
could therefore be seen as coaches who potentially enhance the financial literacy of 
individuals and contribute to improved investment practices and therefore potentially 
increased value (IFIC Report, 2010). 
 
4.4.3 Financial advice and wealth accumulation 
 
An efficient market theorist would contend that financial advice has very little to no positive 
real value effects. However, a recent research paper by Montmarquett and Viennot-Briot 
(2011) demonstrated that financial advice contributes positively and significantly to the 
accumulation of financial wealth i.e. real value.  
In doing this research, Montmarquett and Viennot-Briot made use of econometric 
modelling together with a robust sample of Canadian households to provide valuable 
insights into the process of advised wealth accumulation. To determine the economic 
impact of financial advice, the researchers measured the value added to the initial financial 
assets of each respondent such as cash, stocks, bonds, deposits and other investment 
vehicles. Based on the results, the researchers concluded that the recommendations and 
advice by financial advisors with regards to suitable vehicles for optimisation and tax 
efficiencies increased the net worth of individuals. That is, the average net worth for advised 
investors was approximately three to four times greater than that of non-advised investors 
across all age and income levels in the sample. (Montmarquett & Viennot-Briot, 2011) 
The research also found that the impact on financial assets increased directly with the 
tenure of the advice. The financial assets of households that received advice over various 
periods of time versus that of non-advised households were assessed, excluding the 
influence of all other variables. The data showed that advised households that had worked 
with an advisor for four to six years accumulated 58% more assets than a non-advised 
household that was identical in all other respects. Similarly, an advised household with an 
advisor for seven to fourteen years and fifteen years or more accumulated 99% and 173% 
more assets than non-advised households respectively. (Montmarquett & Viennot-Briot, 
2011) 
The significant differences can be explained by the greater allocation into non-cash 
investments and participation in more tax sheltered plans by the advised investors. The 
differences can also be attributed to a higher household savings rate as a result of improved 
savings behaviour that is encouraged by financial advisors (Montmarquett & Viennot-Briot, 
2011). Due to this behaviour, the research also found that the respondents with financial 
advisors had increased confidence in their level of retirement readiness. (Montmarquett & 
Viennot-Briot, 2011) 
This is not the only positive value that could be derived from financial advice. 
Montmarquett and Viennot-Briot also evaluated the respondents’ perceptions of their level 
of trust and confidence in, as well as their satisfaction with, financial advisors. The levels of 
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trust and confidence in financial advisors were assessed through the use of word 
associations and specific questions. The results indicated strongly that respondents who 
have financial advisors are more likely to have a higher level of trust and confidence in the 
advisors. The level of satisfaction was measured by asking respondents with financial 
advisors to rate them according to specific dimensions such as value for money; knowledge 
level; personal attention; accessibility and service offering. The results showed levels of 
satisfaction to be stable and high. The satisfaction levels ranged from 75% for value for 
money, up to 86% for knowledge level (Montmarquett and Viennot-Briot, 2011). The overall 
study therefore exhibits that once an individual is convinced to retain a financial advisor, 
there is a strong probability that positive real value as well as perceived value will be 
derived.  
 
4.5 The value of financial advice: a contrary view 
 
It is widely accepted that professional financial advisors are better informed and enjoy 
wider access to efficient analytical tools than amateur individuals. It can therefore be 
argued that these advisors are likely to be more rational and therefore less prone to 
behavioural biases. However, as Shapira and Venezia (2000) considered, some professional 
advisors reap financial benefits for investment decisions made, as well as for the volume of 
trades performed on their clients’ behalf. The financial reward can serve as motivation for 
advisors to partake in excess trading activity and therefore be exposed to potential biases 
(such as the self-interest threat). This principal-agent problem was confirmed by Zhoa 
(2005) whose study found that, depending on the fee structure and information 
asymmetries, financial advisors do not always disclose all information to or act in the best 
interest of their clients. Zhoa’s study focussed on flows into mutual funds and found that 
funds with higher provisions had higher inflows. Given the assumption that financial 
advisors earn profits from fee provisions, the study inferred that advisors direct their clients’ 
assets into funds with higher provisions.  
In determining the degree of bias suffered by advisors relative to the individual investors, 
Shapira and Venezia (2000) focussed primarily on the disposition effect. The research found 
that while the disposition effect did exist for financial advisors, it was significantly weaker 
than for individuals. This was further confirmed by studies performed on professional U.S. 
futures traders and mutual funds by Coval and Shumway (2005) and Frazzini (2006) 
respectively. This indicated that behavioural biases may be reduced by professional training 
and experience but does not eliminate it completely (Shapira and Venezia, 2000). Taking 
these findings into account, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2004) considered the 
independence of financial advisors to be an important prerequisite. 
Coval et al (2005) believed that individual traders were in a better position to exploit the 
market given an information advantage, the reason being that, “Individual traders almost 
always trade smaller positions than professional traders. As a result, the pressure that their 
trades impart on prices is likely to be much less. This makes them far better positioned to 
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trade using strategies that exploit smaller and short-term deviations from fundamental 
values” (Coval et al, 2005). Furthermore, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (2010) 
also found that overconfident investors overreact and therefore underestimate risk, trade 
more aggressively and hold riskier assets, which consequently deliver higher returns. 
This is confirmed by Barber and Odean (2000) who found that not all individuals do poorly in 
their investments. Their study illustrated that the top-performing quartile of individual 
accounts in their dataset outperformed the market on average by 0.5 percent per month. 
Hirschleifer and Ying Luo (2001) also found that overconfident investors who exploited valid 
information would result in higher than expected profits due to their more aggressive 
approach. Studies therefore suggest that skilled and informed individual investors can 
perform well and earn abnormal profits. However, the average individual does not 




In conclusion, Coval et al (2005) states that individual investors are often regarded as, at 
best, uninformed and, at worst, fools. This statement is given truth by the vast number of 
cases in which the overwhelming amounts of information and behavioural biases have led 
to individuals making incorrect investment choices. These biases have not only caused 
significant welfare losses for individuals but also enhancements in the field of behavioural 
finance as a result of the consequent deviations from existing financial theories. Several 
studies, as mentioned above, have concluded that financial advice is a potential mitigating 
factor in the individual decision making process. The media often coax individual investors 
into thinking that they can do better on their own, however, the reality is that common 
judgement errors can be avoided by working with an objective and trained professional. In 
doing so both positive real and perceived value is obtained. Timura (2006) explains that 
financial advisors are more protective of their clients’ interests and are therefore more 
thorough in their decision making than if they were making the decisions for themselves. 
Therefore it can be concluded that “there should be an observable advantage to having 
someone else decide investment issues, not because that someone is smarter or more 
experienced, but simply because that person is someone else” (Timura, 2006). 
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5. Design & methodology 
 
This section of the study will focus on the research questions derived based on the guidance 
provided by the literature review. The data and methodology utilised to answer the 
research questions posed is detailed as well.  
 
5.1 Research questions 
 
An analysis of the literature review provides guidance regarding the value of financial 
advice. The literature indicates that financial advisors do, in most scenarios, provide value 
for their client compared to the non-advised individual investor.  
The primary focus of this study is to determine whether, and if so why, there is real value 
created by financial advisors for advised investors compared to non-advised individual 
investors. The focus of the study in answering this question is broadly categorised into three 
namely; return analysis, trading behaviour analysis and risk profile analysis. 
Return analysis: 
The return analysis focuses on the primary question of the study whether financial advisors 
do create value for investors. This analysis compares the returns of the advised investors to 
non-advised investors over the period. This will provide insight as to whether real value has 
been created by financial advisors. 
The next question to be evaluated is whether the actual return of advised and non-advised 
investors is greater than the return of the fund over the period. The fund was specifically 
selected in that its investment mandate is focused on equity investments within the South 
African market. The fund is openly available for direct public investment (non-advised), and 
also has advised investors. The reason for the utilisation of this fund is that equity data is 
more readily available for the individual investor (non-advised) in comparison to money 
market investments; this will assist non-advised investors to make better investment 
decisions.  
This question will provide insight as to whether active management of the portfolio provides 
a greater return than passive management by the investors, in relation to the fund. This 
analysis of the return data provides the following three questions to be evaluated, detailed 
below: 
1. Is there a difference in the returns between advised and non-advised investors; and 
2. Is there a difference in the returns between advised investors and the fund over the 
period; and 




Trading behaviour analysis: 
Once the return analysis has been evaluated relating to whether the financial advisors have 
generated greater returns for advised investors compared to non-advised investor, the 
question is raised as to what has created this difference. The trading behaviour of the 
advised and non-advised investors are analysed to determine whether active or passive 
management of the portfolio created the difference in returns. The trading behaviour 
analysis is evaluated in relation to the number of trades made and the correlation between 
trades made and return generated over the period. This analysis of the trading behaviour 
provides the following two questions to be evaluated, detailed below: 
1. Do advised investors trade more than non-advised investors; and 
2. Is there a correlation between the number of trades made and the return generated 
for advised and non-advised investors. 
Risk profile analysis: 
Further the literature review also eluded to, in certain studies, who uses financial advisors. 
An important element of the role of a financial advisor is to match the risk profile of an 
investor to an appropriate investment. The risk profile of the advised and non-advised 
investors’ will be evaluated through an analysis of the qualitative data. The attributes 
evaluated of the investor profiles are: 
1. The gender; and 
2. The marital status; and 
3. The age of advised and non-advised investors. 
This attribute profiling of the investor will allow a high level qualitative comparison of the 







The data was obtained from a large South African investment house which hold records of 
the individual investor performance and demographic information. The investment house 
provides collective investment schemes (unit trusts/funds) investment offerings, with each 
fund having a different risk profile and investment mandate. A request was made to the 
investment house to provide the following information relating to the individual investors; 
the return generated, the trades entered over the period, age, gender, and marital status. 
The data detailed whether the individual investors were advised or non-advised; all 
corporate investments were excluded. The data covered the period 1 January 2005 to 31 
December 2014 of a specific equity fund of the investment house. 
Only one fund was selected for evaluation rather than a comparison of investment returns 
per the individual investor, as each investor has a unique risk profile. For example, 
comparing the return of an investor in a money market fund is not comparable to an 
investor in an equity fund as the risk-return profile of the funds are not comparable. The 
analysis of the single equity fund overcame this issue. The total number of investors in the 
fund from the original data provided was 20 371. 
The investors that were invested in the fund over the 10 year period were identified using 
the unique field ‘client no’. From the 20 371 total investors in the fund 7 767 individuals 
were invested for the full period of 10 years. The client listing of the 7 767 individuals was 
then evaluated by the investment house as to whether the investor was advised, non-
advised or had a resigned broker. The field ‘servicingagentname’ was utilised to determine 
whether the investor was advised, non-advised or resigned, this field detailed the financial 
advisor providing advice to the investor. The advisor information was provided on a monthly 
basis. The listing of financial advisors was reviewed for reasonability and compared to the 
monthly listing of investors.  
The investor data was limited to those that were either advised, through a financial advisor, 
non-advised, or resigned throughout the period. Investors which had an advisor who was no 
longer active, or changed the status to non-advised over the period or vice-versa were 
excluded. These investors were excluded as they were not advised or non-advised over the 
full period, further when an investor is attached to an inactive broker the data is inaccurate 
as no advice would have been obtained from the inactive broker. From the 7 767 investors 
over the full period, 2 131 had a resigned broker during the period. Of the remaining 5 636 
investors only 4 147 were either advised with an active broker or non-advised for the full 
period, the other 1 489 were either advised or non-advised but then changed during the 
period. 
These data manipulations provided the initial listing of advised and non-advised investors 
over the period of 4 147. The sample from the population is 1805 non-advised (direct per 
the investment house classification) and 2342 advised (intermediated per the investment 
house classification) investors. 
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The investment house provided the market value at the beginning and end of the period for 
all investors as well as all the trade transactions entered into by the investors over the 
period. This data was utilised to calculate the XIRR for each of the investors over the period. 
The XIRR is similar in nature to the traditional internal rate of return (IRR) calculation. The 
XIRR is utilised when the cash flows are not of equal timing. This is appropriate in this 
scenario as the investors do not invest nor withdraw at regular set intervals. The XIRR 
calculation standardises the calculation of the returns across all investors and is comparable 
to the fund return over the period. 
An analysis of all the return data points was performed in order to evaluate for potential 
outliers. The distribution of all data points was evaluated via a histogram and the returns 
were sorted from highest to lowest. The underlying data and XIRR return calculations were 
evaluated as well to determine whether there were issues regarding the returns. The 
highest and lowest 15 returns were evaluated in further detail when considering the 
distribution of returns and quantum in relation to the mean. Only the top five highest and 
lowest XIRR returns are detailed below, from which the exclusions occurred. 
Table 5.2.1: Top five highest and lowest XIRR results 
 








The four items highlighted in orange from the highest XIRR results have been excluded from 
the population as the return observations were distant from all other return observations. 
These data points were removed considering the distribution of returns, distance to the 
mean return and underlying calculations. The underlying data detailing the cash flows 
associated with the four exclusions were not in line with the other results – i.e. there was a 
large final cash outflow at the end despite the withdrawals or limited movement during the 
period. These outliers were removed from the population in order to exclude any potential 
affects these items would have on the study. There was one observation with no result 
which was excluded from the study as well. The remaining observations were left in the 
study. The sample of investors was adjusted accordingly to 2339 advised investors and 1803 
non-advised investors, a total of 4142 investors. 
Through the trading data provided by the investment house the total number of trades 
were calculated and assigned to the relevant investor. The number of trades were 
calculated from the investments and withdrawals data provided. The investment and 
withdrawal data was in the form of either lump sums or monthly annuities (withdrawals or 









debit order investments). The monthly annuities were denoted with the following field 
‘MIP’. In determining the number of trades for each investor monthly annuities were 
accounted for as one transaction, as it only relates to one investment decision made in 
relation to the investment by the investor.  
Further, any distributions of dividends by the fund are automatically re-invested into the 
fund, as per the investment house’s business model. These re-investments were excluded 
from the trading data, as this was not an active investment made by the individual and will 
not affect the comparable return between investors. 
The investment house also provided the following personal static data; gender, age, and 
marital status which was utilised to determine the risk profile of the investors. The marital 
status field included ‘other’ which was excluded in the analysis. The following marital status 
categories; single, widowed and divorced were all considered part of the single classification 
of investors as they would make investment decisions individually. 
For each of the investor samples noted the following additional data was calculated and 






The methodology to evaluate the research questions is similar in nature to that of Marszalek 
(2014) and Willows (2012), therefore these studies were utilised as a starting point. This 
section of the study is broken down in two general sections: firstly, to detail the 
methodology utilised by Marszalek (2014) and Willows (2012), and thereafter to evaluate 
the specific research strategy for the research questions posed. 
 
5.3.1 Marszalek (2014) and Willows (2012) 
 
Marszalek (2014) and Willows (2012) evaluated non-advised investors and whether there is 
a difference in the performance of men and women. The focus of this study, however, is on 
advised compared to non-advised investors rather than men versus women. The 
methodology applied to the data in those studies is similar to that utilised in this study. 
Willows (2012) utilised data from the South African investment house. The initial data 
specifications were provided to enable extraction of information relating to gender, age and 
return. The Investment House’s offerings were collective investment schemes (commonly 
referred to as unit trusts), with each unit trust having different risk profiles to cater for 
different risk appetites. 
Willows (2012) obtained the data on an individual investor basis. This data was utilised to 
analyse the returns of men versus women over the period of 1 January 2007 to 31 
December 2011. The focus of the analysis was on three questions, does trading frequency 
influence investor return; do men trade more than women; and do men earn lower returns 
than women.  
This study was replicated by Marszalek (2014) in a similar manner utilising information from 
a South African investment house with data over the period of 1 January 2003 to 31 
December 2012.  
As can be seen from these studies the questions researched are similar to that which this 
study focuses on. Therefore the methodology applied to those research questions will be 
utilised in this study as a starting point. The research questions posed are however focused 
on non-advised versus advised investments rather than men versus women. 
The Marszalek (2014) and Willows (2012) methodology was adapted based on the 
methodology utilised by Barber & Odean (2001). Barber & Odean’s (2001) research focused 
on the same questions as evaluated by Marszalek (2014) and Willows (2012), however, the 
data was obtained from a large discount brokerage firm and evaluated the month end 
returns of households’ common stock investments over a 6 year period, ending December 
1996. This data was coupled with the demographic data on gender to evaluate the results 




5.4 Research strategy 
 
An evaluation of the underlying data integrity, as stated in section 5.4.1, identified that the 
distribution of the data is not normal. As a result, the research approach to answer the 
questions was adapted in line with this difference. 
The approach to each of the research questions is detailed in this section of the study. 
 
5.4.1 Evaluation of data integrity 
 
The Central Limit Theorem states that the sampling distribution of the sample mean will 
move towards the normal probability distribution and, the larger the number of 
observations in each sample, the stronger the convergence (Lind, Marchal, & Wathen, 
2005). A visual test is performed to evaluate whether the population is normally distributed. 
The visual diagram in Appendix 1 indicates that the populations of the advised and non-
advised investor returns are not normally distributed. Appendix 1 indicates that there is a 
large degree of kurtosis around the mean. 
In order to confirm the data returns were not normally distributed, two tests were 
performed: the Kolmogarov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test. These two tests 
evaluate the returns data and whether the returns of both the advised and non-advised 
investors are normally distributed. The null hypothesis for these tests are: 
H0: The return data of the advised and non-advised returns are normally distributed 
The results are detailed below. 
Advised returns data: 
Table 5.4.1.1: Advised data Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
D Statistic 0.5247 
One sided p-value Less than 2.2-16 
Two sided p-value Less than 2.2-16 
 
Table 5.4.1.2: Advised data Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test 
W Statistic 0.349 




Non-advised returns data: 
Table 5.4.1.3: Non-advised data Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
D Statistic 0.5321 
One sided p-value Less than 2.2-16 
Two sided p-value Less than 2.2-16 
 
Table 5.4.1.4: Non-advised data Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test 
W Statistic 0.2119 
p-value Less than 2.2-16 
 
The two tests performed above provide a p-value of approximately zero (the result of less 
than 2.2
-16
 is the smallest p-value that can be derived utilising the statistics programme) for 
both the advised and non-advised returns data. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected, and 
conclude that the data is not normal. The return data was manipulated utilising log and 
exponential transformations, however, these also resulted in the data not being normally 
distributed. 
A visual test to evaluate whether the population of total trades in relation to the investors is 
normally distributed is detailed in Appendix 2. This appendix for the number of trades made 
by advised and non-advised investors over the period demonstrates that the population is 
not normally distributed as well. 
As a result, non-parametric tests are utilised to evaluate the research questions. A (non-
parametric) Mann-Whitney U-test will be used to evaluate whether the returns and the 
number of trades made by an advised investor is statistically significant to that made by a 
non-advised investor. The Mann-Whitney U-test follows the methodology that the data of 
both samples is ranked, as if it were one sample, from smallest to largest. The average of 
the ranks is then compared between the two samples as well as whether the ranks are 
evenly distributed between the two samples. If these two criteria are met then the null 
hypothesis is accepted. The null hypothesis assumes there is no difference between the 




5.4.2 Value creation by financial advisors for investors 
 
In order to test whether there is a statistically significant difference between the returns of 
advised and non-advised investments, a Mann-Whitney U-test was performed. The Mann-
Whitney U-test is used as the underlying returns data is not normally distributed. 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no difference between the returns of advised and 
non-advised investors over the period.  
 
5.4.3 Evaluation of the return generated by advised and non-advised investors in relation to 
the fund over the period 
 
In order to test whether there is a statistically significant difference between the returns of 
advised and non-advised investments in relation the fund return over the period, a Mann-
Whitney U-test was performed. The test is performed separately for advised and non-
advised investors in relation to the fund. The Mann-Whitney U-test is used as the underlying 
returns data is not normally distributed. The fund return over the period was 14.9%, this 
data was provided by the investment house. 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no difference between the returns of advised 
investors and the fund over the period.  
This is repeated for the non-advised investors return compared to the fund return over the 
period, in the same manner as for advised investors. 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no difference between the returns of non-advised 
investors and the fund over the period.  
 
5.4.4 Evaluation of the number of trades made by advised and non-advised investors 
 
To evaluate whether there is a statistically significant difference between the number of 
trades made by advised investors compared to that made by non-advised investors, a 
Mann-Whitney U-test is performed. The Mann-Whitney U-test is used as the underlying 
trade data is not normally distributed.  
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no difference between the number of trades made 




5.4.5 Evaluation of the influence of the number of trades on the return generated 
 
A correlation test was performed to evaluate whether a relationship exists between the 
number of trades made (independent variable) and the returns generated (the dependant 
variable) over the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2014. The test was performed 
separately for advised investors and non-advised investors. A Spearman Rho correlation 
evaluation was performed.  
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no correlation between the number of trades made 
by advised and the return generated. 
This is repeated for non-advised investors’ number of trades compared to the return 
generated over the period, in the same manner as for advised investors. 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no correlation between the number of trades made 
by non-advised and the return generated. 
 
5.4.6 Risk profile analysis of the investors 
 
The attribute data of advised and non-advised investors will be evaluated with regards to 
age, gender, and marital status. The mean and median age as well as the gender and marital 
status proportions of the investor for both advised and non-advised populations, was 
calculated.  
This is to determine whether the ‘typical’ advised/non-advised investor conforms to the 
attributes detailed by Bluethgen et al (2008) and the study by the FSB in 2011. The data is 
also used to evaluate the risk profile of the two populations over the period and whether 




A confidentiality agreement was signed by parties at both the University of Cape Town and 
the investment house. This was done in order to ensure that the identity of the investment 
house and all confidential information obtained would be protected from disclosure. 
No ethical clearances were required as the study has no interest in racial differences nor 





This section of the study evaluates the results of the research questions in relation to the 
literature review expectations developed. Findings that warrant specific attention are 
evaluated further and appropriate conclusions drawn. 
 
6.1 Value creation by financial advisors for investors 
 
The Mann-Whitney U-test performed evaluated the null hypothesis (H0): there is no 
difference in the returns of advised and non-advised investors over the period.  
Table 6.1.1: Advised and non-advised returns 
Mann Whitney U Test 
U Statistic 2157906 
p-value 0.1964 
 
The result above indicates that there is no statistical difference between the returns of 
advised and non-advised investors at the 95% confidence level for the 10 year period ending 
31 December 2014. 
Advised investors were found to have a marginally lower average annualised return of 
14.67% compared to non-advised investors of 14.69%. However the median across both 
investor groups was found to be the same at 14.65%. This is summarised below. 
Table 6.1.2: Investor average and median for the period 
  Return analysis 
  Advised Non-advised 
Average XIRR 14.67% 14.69% 
Median XIRR 14.65% 14.65% 
 
The above result seems contrary to the analysis of literature review which indicates that 
financial advisors through their access to greater information and analytical tools are 
expected to create greater value than non-advised individuals. The non-advised investors 
were expected to be more prone behavioural biases compared to advised investors and as a 
result generate lower returns. 
This conclusion was not, however, evident from the results above; the non-advised 
investors created greater annual average returns over the period compared to the advised 
investors despite the lower access to information and analytical tools.  
A major factor which contributes to this result is that the investment is made with an 
investment house. Within the investment house after the initial investment decision (of 
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which fund to invest in) is made by either non-advised or advised investors, the subsequent 
investment decisions within the fund is made by the investment house in accordance with 
the fund mandate. Therefore the behavioural biases and the lack of information or 
analytical tools does not play an integral part to the non-advised investor as what it may 
have played if the investment decisions were all exclusively made by the individual. The 
major decision to be made by the investor (advised or not) is to time the market and ensure 
funds are exited at the correct point to optimise return; it is through these timings that the 
variances in return is calculated, and value of advice evident. 
The variance in return between the advised and non-advised through inspection of the 
histogram data in Appendix 1 is not significantly different. The returns are closely 
concentrated around the mean; this is supported by the mean and median annual returns 
over the period detailed above. Despite the slight over performance of non-advised 
investors (not significantly) the variance of the returns is not viewed as significantly 
different. 
The advised and non-advised investors created similar real values over the period, however 
the advised investor may have greater perceived value through the trust, confidence and 
satisfaction developed in the investment decisions made by the financial advisor. 
Furthermore, the Montmarquett and Veinnot-Briot (2011) study indicated that greater 
returns were evident from advised investors compared to non-advised investors the longer 
the tenure of investment, this was again not evident in the results above.  
The cost of information as mentioned by Fischer and Gerhardt (2007) in order to participate 
actively in the investment market is eliminated through the investment house. The 
investment house obtains a management fee from the fund, in order to manage the assets 
and generate an optimum return. The elimination of this participation cost to the non-
advised individual, through the investment house’s access to information and allowing the 
investment house’s expertise to manage the investment decision, has not resulted in sub-
optimal investment decisions as detailed by Bluethgen et al (2008). This management fee 
cost is included in the return calculated for both advised and non-advised investors, as it is 
embodied in the value of the fund. 
There is however potential additional advisory fees (which are not reflected in the return 
data) relating to the advised investment. The fee would relate to the cost of the advice 
provided, which the non-advised investors do not incur. This cost however was not able to 
be obtained by the investment house, as the cost is evidenced with the investor 
administration services charge, and not through the investment house. This cost would have 
lowered the real return of the advised investors even further in relation to non-advised 
investors.  
In conclusion, there is no significant difference in the real value created between advised 
and non-advised investors, a major reason is due to the investment house and the role it 





6.2 Investor returns in relation to the fund 
 
The evaluation of advised and non-advised returns in relation to the fund were performed 
through a Mann-Whitney U-test separately for each investor. The null hypothesis (H0): there 
is no difference in the returns of the investor and the fund over the period. 
Advised investors: 
Table 6.2.1: Advised investor returns compared to the fund 
Mann Whitney U Test 




The result above indicates that there is no statistical difference between the returns of 
advised investors and the fund at the 95% confidence level for the 10 year period ending 31 
December 2014. 
Non-advised investors: 
Table 6.2.1: Non-advised investor returns compared to the fund 
Mann Whitney U Test 




The result above indicates as well that there is no statistical difference between the returns 
of non-advised investors and the fund at the 95% confidence level for the 10 year period 
ending 31 December 2014. 
This is in line with the expectations considering the fund’s annualised return for the period 
was 14.9% in relation to the average and median annualised returns for advised and non-
advised returns as detailed in 6.1. 
The result further confirms the discussions above relating to the influence of the investment 
house on the returns generated. Only market timing of transactions over the period will 
create a difference in return in relation to the investment house, as the investment house 
performs the function of making the investment decisions on behalf of the investors. This 
timing of the market effect was not significant in comparison to the fund, as seen through 
the close relation of the returns over the period.  
The cost of the investment house performing this investment function eliminates numerous 
costs to access information and behavioural biases as experienced by the non-advised 
investor. The investment house is therefore viewed as a trusted advisor in order to make 
some of the investment decisions. As a result the returns of the non-advised and advised 




6.3 Trading behaviour of advised and non-advised investors 
 
The Mann-Whitney U-test performed evaluated the null hypothesis (H0): there is no 
difference in the number of trades of advised and non-advised investors over the period.  
Table 6.3.1: Advised and non-advised trading behaviour 
Mann Whitney U Test 
U Statistic 2381243 
p-value Less than 2.2-16 
 
The small p-value indicates that there is statistically significant difference at the 95% 
confidence level between the number of trades of advised investors compared to non-
advised investors over the 10 year period ending 31 December 2014. 
A summary of the number of trades’ analysis between advised and non-advised investors is 
detailed below. 
Table 6.3.2: Summary of trade analysis 
  Trade analysis 
  Advised Non-advised 
Average no. trades 3.51 0.67 
Median no. trades 0.00 0.00 
Count total no. trades 8199 1203 
 
The analysis above provides evidence that there is a difference between the number of 
trades between advised and non-advised investors. The advised investors are being 
recommended by their financial advisor to enter or exit positions in the fund to a greater 
extent than non-advised investors. In order to determine whether the variance of the 
number of trades made by advised investors is statistically different to the variance of the 
number of trades by non-advised investors, a Brown-Forsythe test is performed. 
A Brown-Forsythe test is performed on data which is not normally distributed, with regards 
to the number of trades made. The test is the equivalent of the F-test which is performed on 
normally distributed data. The null hypothesis evaluated is (H0): there is no difference in the 
variance of the number of trades of advised and non-advised investors over the period. 
Table 6.3.3: Advised and non-advised trading variance 
Brown-Forsythe (Levene) Test 
Test Statistic 89.9516 
p-value Less than 2.2-16
 
 
The small p-value indicates that there is a statistically significant difference at the 95% 
confidence level between the variance of the number of trades of advised investors 
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compared to non-advised investors over the 10 year period ending 31 December 2014. 
When considering the two tables above it can be concluded that advised investors’ trade 
significantly more than non-advised investors, and have a significantly greater variance in 
the number of trades than non-advised investors.  
A potential reason for the significantly larger number of trades by advised investors is that 
through regular advice and evaluation of the investor’s portfolio, the financial advisor is able 
to recommend to the investor to transact more/adjust investment positions. However, this 
has not translated into any significant difference between the returns of advised investors 
compared to the returns of non-advised investors or the fund over the period.  
The average return for advised investors was in fact the lowest over the period in 
comparison to the fund and non-advised investors. The real value generated from the 
additional trades made by advised investors is not significantly different to the return 
generated for non-advised investors or the fund. Further, there are additional 
administration and trading fees for the advised investor to perform these additional 
transactions which are not accounted for in the return analysis which would further lower 
the return to the investor. 
The number of trades is analysed further per the table below which evaluates the 
percentage of investors which have made no trades or five or less trades over the period. 
Table 6.3.4: Investor number of trades 
  Trade analysis 
  Advised Non-advised 
Percentage investors who made no trades 67% 78% 
Percentage investors with 5 trades or less 90% 98% 
 
The table above illustrates that the majority of investors did not trade within each group 
and that more than 90% traded 5 or less times over the period. The percentage is higher in 
the non-advised investors than the advised as they did not have financial advisors providing 
continuous advice on their investment position. Furthermore, the result illustrates that the 
higher the percentage of little to no trades (non-advised investors), the closer this investor 
group was to achieving the average fund return over the period. As advised investors traded 
more, their average return was less than that of the fund and the non-advised investor 
group. This indicates the advice being provided regarding the market timing did not create 
additional value over the fund return. 
The question raised then is; why is there a significantly higher number of trades for advised 
investors without significant reward. This is an anomaly as the investment decision function 
is made by the investment house and the results indicate that the investment house has 
performed better over the period. A few factors are evident from the literature review 
which may be applied to this result. 
Behavioural biases as mentioned indicate that overconfident investors believe in their 
ability/view more than they should and as a result trade more than what is expected of a 
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rational investor. (Odean, 1998 and Barber and Odean, 2001). These studies were related to 
non-advised investors however it may be applicable here as well in that the financial 
advisors believe their view of the market to be more accurate than the investment house 
and as a result trade more based on their view. The cost of deviations from traditional 
financial theories has been shown to cause welfare losses (Fischer and Gerhardt, 2007), and 
these deviations have also resulted in real losses compared to the fund as illustrated above.  
An additional behavioural reason may be due to financial advisors being viewed as a trusted 
business partner, providing valuable insights. The financial advisors may therefore feel 
obliged to provide recommendations to the advised investors in order to create the 
impression of understanding the market and adding value, which may not be the case as in 
this scenario. 
A more significant factor as detailed by Shapira & Venezia (2000) indicates that financial 
advisors may obtain financial rewards for the volume of trades made, which may serve as 
motivation to partake in excessive trading activities. This poses an additional and more 
significant behavioural bias – a self-interest threat of the financial advisor. This was 
confirmed by Zhoa (2005) which indicated that depending on the fee structure financial 
advisors may not act in the best interest of their clients. These factors detailed are likely to 
drive the actions of the financial advisor and explain the significant over-trading 
experienced.  
Therefore the additional trades made by advised investors did not create significant value 
for the investors in relation to non-advised investors and the fund return. Further on a risk-
adjusted basis through the results detailed in section 6 thus far it, may be noted that the 
returns of advised investors would be even lower due to additional advisory, administration 
and transaction costs which are associated with the financial advisor and additional 
transactions entered. 
 
6.4 Influence of trading frequency on investor return 
 
The Spearman Rho correlation test that was performed evaluated whether there is a 
significant relationship between the number of trades entered and the return generated for 
investors. This was performed separately for advised and non-advised investors. 
H0: There is no correlation between the number of trades made and the return generated 
by investors 
Advised investors: 
Table 6.4.1: Advised number of trades and return correlation 
Spearman Rho Correlation Test 





The small p-value indicates that there is statistically significant correlation at the 95% 
confidence level between the number of trades of advised investors and the return 
generated over the 10 year period ending 31 December 2014. 
The negative correlation indicates that as additional trades are made by advised investors 
the return decreases as a result, a statistically significant observation. In saying that though 
the correlation is close to zero therefore the relationship is not particularly strong. 
Non-advised investors: 
Table 6.4.2: Non-advised number of trades and return correlation 
Spearman Rho Correlation Test 
Rho correlation -0.166387 
p-value 1.162-12 
 
The small p-value indicates that there is statistically significant correlation at the 95% 
confidence level between the number of trades of non-advised investors and the return 
generated over the 10 year period ending 31 December 2014. 
The negative correlation indicates that as additional trades are made by non-advised 
investors, the return decreases as a result – a statistically significant observation. The 
correlation is close to zero therefore the relationship is not particularly strong.  
The correlation is a greater negative for non-advised investors indicating that the more they 
trade, the lower their return compared to advised investors. Therefore the main reason for 
non-advised investors outperformance of advised investors is due to not trading and 
therefore the return tending towards the fund return. 
 
6.5 Risk analysis of investor profile 
 
An analysis was performed on the qualitative data of age, gender and marital status to 
evaluate whether any of these may have contributed to the difference in results as well as 
evaluating the risk profile of the two investor groups. 
Table 6.5.1: Investor marital status analysis 
  Static data analysis Relative weighting percent 
  Advised Non-advised Advised Non-advised 
Percentage married 53.8% 48.7% 57.2% 55.7% 
Total percent single 40.2% 38.7% 42.8% 44.3% 
Percentage single 37.6% 36.1%     
Percentage widowed 2.1% 2.4%     
Percentage divorced 0.5% 0.3%     




The analysis of the married versus single data was restricted to the investors whom included 
data in this qualitative field. The data indicates that as a relative percentage there are more 
married individuals with financial advisors compared to non-advised married investors. This 
is expected as married individuals are expected to be more risk averse than single 
individuals as they have a household to support, therefore they would utilise a financial 
advisor to minimise the risk. 
Table 6.5.2: Investor age analysis  
 Static data analysis 
  Advised Non-advised 
Average age                   56.54                 54.94  
Median age                   57.77                 55.32  
 
The age analysis of the investor profile indicates that non-advised investors have a lower 
median and average age compared to advised investors. This is in line with expectations as 
younger investors are willing to take on greater risk compared to older individuals and as 
result not seeking the advice of a financial advisor. 
Table 6.5.3: Investor gender analysis 
  Static data analysis 
  Advised Non-advised 
Percentage women 48.3% 47.8% 
Percentage men 51.7% 52.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The gender analysis of the investor profile indicates that a greater percentage of men are 
non-advised compared to the men percentage that are advised investors. This again is in 
line with the expectations as men are overconfident and therefore trust their own ability to 
make investment decisions. 
These results are all in line with the expectations as mentioned by Barber and Odean (2001) 
that men are more overconfident compared to women and thus have a greater percentage 
in non-advised investors. Further the Bluethgen et al (2008) study confirmed that “older, 
wealthier, more risk averse, or females are more likely to obtain financial advice”, this is in 
line with the result of the advised and non-advised data set detailed above.  
As seen from the results, the differences within the advised and non-advised investor group 
are not significant. Therefore the risk profile of the two groups are similar, however the 
reward slightly less for advised investors compared to non-advised investors and the fund 
return. This again emphasises the point that once the investment choice in the fund is 
made, whether through an advisor or not, it is better to remain in that fund, if the risk 
profile is appropriate, and be a passive investor.  
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The minor differences between the risk profiles within the investment groups may also 
contribute to the fact that the return generated within the two investor groups are not 
significantly different. However when evaluating the trading behaviour it was noted a 
significant difference in the number of trades entered between the advised and non-advised 
investors. The additional trades by the advised investors demonstrates the influence that an 
advisor has in influencing the trading behaviour. This is especially evident considering the 
risk profile of the investors is not different and therefore would not expect significantly 
different trading behaviour in isolation. 
It is important to note that the risk profiles of the two investor group are similar as the 
investment product is the same and should therefore match the risks of the individual i.e. 
the risk reward profile is to match. This is an important concept in financial advice to tailor 





7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Summary of results 
 
This study about the value of financial advice showed that there was no statistical difference 
at the 95% confidence level between the returns generated by advised investors compared 
to non-advised investors. The average annual return of non-advised investors was greater 
than that of non-advised investors. The reason for there being no statistical difference in 
returns is due to the decisions made by the investment house. The decisions of the 
investment house eliminated the behavioural biases and costs to obtain information 
associated with an individual investor.  
The fund return was marginally superior to the return generated by both advised and non-
advised investors. This return was however not statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level and echoes the finding relating to the role played by the investment house decisions.  
Since the investment decisions were made with the necessary expertise, the optimal result 
over the 10 year period ending 31 December 2014 was provided by the fund. 
Furthermore, advised investors traded significantly more than non-advised investors at the 
95% confidence level. The variance in the trades was also statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level indicating that the variance in the advised number of trades was greater 
than the variance of the non-advised number of trades. The additional trades entered into 
by advised investors was due to the active management and guidance provided by the 
financial advisors throughout the period. This finding, however, did not result in a significant 
difference in the annual return compared to non-advised investors or the fund. In fact, the 
average annual return by advised investors over the period was the lowest when compared 
to the fund and non-advised investors.  
The additional number of trades were attributed to the possible causes of firstly 
overconfidence of the financial advisors in their ability compared to that of the investment 
house, secondly the incentive of the financial advisor to maintain the impression of being a 
trusted advisor and therefore regularly offering advice/insight to the financial market, and 
lastly but more significantly through the financial advisor’s self-interest threat. The self-
interest threat manifests in the fee and remuneration structure of the financial advisor who 
may be rewarded based on the number/value of trades made. 
Furthermore as a result of the additional trades made by advised investors not creating 
additional value, thus on a risk-adjusted basis it may be noted that the returns of advised 
investors would be even lower due to additional advisory fees associated with the advice 




A statistically significant negative correlation was found to exist between the number of 
trades made and the return generated by both advised and non-advised investors. The 
negative relation was however not strong between the number of trades and return 
generated.  
The risk profile of the investors between the advised and non-advised investors was similar, 
which was expected in order to match the risk reward profile of the fund. The advised 
investors had a more risk-averse profile with a lower average and median age, and included 
a larger percentage of women and married investors. This was due to these investors relying 
on the advice of the financial advisor in order to manage their risk preferences. 
 
7.2 Recommendation and areas for future research 
 
An important element of investing is to match the risk return profile of the investor. In this 
study a high level analysis was performed to determine the risk profiles of the investor 
groups and whether the investment was appropriate for the investors. Scope exists to 
perform a detailed investor level analysis to evaluate whether the risk return profile of the 
investors are appropriate. This analysis should be performed on an investor level as well as 
considering all other investments held. The analysis should go further to evaluate whether 
financial advisors adequately match the investor’s risk appetite over time and whether the 
investments change over time as the risk of the investor does as well.  
The data used in this study was limited in that it was only from one fund of one investment 
house. The results evaluated therefore do not account for other investments held by the 
investor in other funds or investment houses. This study therefore does not account for the 
complete investment horizon of the individual and the investment evaluated in this fund 
may not be indicative of the investors’ overall investment strategy or guidance provided by 
the financial advisor. An analysis should be performed to evaluate the complete investment 
horizon of the investor to determine overall investment return of the advised investor 
compared to the non-advised investor. 
An anomaly in the study was the significant high number of transactions entered into by 
advised investors considering the investment house had made the major investment 
decisions. An analysis can be performed on the incentives that drive financial advisors and 
whether these incentives are what promote the advice provided or whether the interest of 
the investor is maintained at all times. 
The analysis of this study should be extended further to evaluate the return of the advised 
investors after accounting for the additional advisory fees incurred through the investment 
administration services company. This adjusted return should be evaluated to determine 






The analyses in this study showed that the initial decision of where and which fund to invest 
in, was the most significant. After that decision had been made there was no significant 
benefit of financial advisors compared to the individual investor or fund.  
The fund would act in accordance with its mandate and manage the investment decision 
thereafter. The results indicate that it is better to invest and maintain the position in the 
fund rather than trade numerous positions as the fund return was greater average return of 
advised and non-advised investors. The trading activity of investors did not generate 
additional returns and had a slight negative correlation with performance. 
The financial advisor has a role to play in order to match the risk profile of the investor to 
the appropriate fund. Thereafter there is no real value created by the financial advisor. The 
advised investor may obtain perceived value through the comfort of knowing a financial 
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Appendix 2: Number of trades data visual inspection for normal distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
